学术报告
Jury Voting: Beyond Condorcet Jury Theorem
发布日期:2022-05-26  来源:   查看次数:

报告时间:2022年6月03日(周五)下午16:00-17:30

报告地点:线上、腾讯会议号:781-602-376

人:陈礴

工作单位:University of Warwick

举办单位:manbetx手机版登录注册

报告简介:

In deciding the true state of Nature (e.g., Innocent or Guilty), we extend the well-known Condorcet Jury Theorem (1785) in several directions in terms of models, voting mechanisms and optimality criteria. After discussions about applications of the Condorcet model, we address the following set of questions: (a) Is there an optimal voting order of heterogenous jurors (agents) for a given voting mechanism? If yes, which order? (b) Which voting mechanism is better, sequential or simultaneous? (c) How do heterogeneity and homogeneity of the agents precisely affect optimality? (d) Under private information, when is honest sequential voting strategic, or perfectly optimal?

报告人简介:

陈礴:英国社会科manbetx手机版登录注册登录院士,运筹学会(ORS)会士,数学及其应用学会(IMA)会士。英国华威大学教授。兼复旦大学讲座教授。自2006年起为诺贝尔经济学奖提名专家。曾获1997年英国经济与社会研究基金会Senior Fellowship,2007年英国工程与物理科学研究基金会科学与创新奖。他的主要研究方向包括组合最优化、调度与运输、博弈论与机制设计。

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